Juvenile Court, 7 CRm & DELINQUENCY 97, 97-100 (1961) . 4 The differential treatment of juveniles in courts of law came to this country from England, see Ketcham, supra note 3 at 98-99. The mere fact of the acceptance of this concept, coupled with the existence of a separate legal system of justice for the juvenile for nearly three quarters of a century indicates the acceptance of the proposition that juveniles deserve non-adult treatment in our courts.
before the court for an antisocial act or course of conduct.' It is apparent that the goals of a system of juvenile court justice would be thwarted, if not completely deterred, if such a socio-quasi-judicial institution were subjected to all of the stringent common law and constitutional requirements of a traditional legal proceeding. 6 Especially thwarting are those legal rules which serve to protect a criminal-accused in the usual administration of criminal justiceY The conflict between traditional rights of those 5 Implicit in even the most critical attacks upon the juvenile court system is the acceptance of the fundamental concept of treating juveniles differently from adults. The real bone of contention is the degree of differential treatment. Thus critics assail deprivation of particular rights of juveniles, and when too horrified by what they find, advocate abolition of the system because unable to see a satisfactory alternative. For an analysis of specific problems in the juvenile court system with a discussion of criticisms of the system see Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MnN. L. REv. 547 (1957) . Professor Paulsen's approach to juvenile court shortcomings is illustrative of the approach here referred to; criticism of the system is objectively stated in specific terms without a blind cry for its abolition. Professor Paulsen states: "This article is an attempt to discover what courts can do to protect the rights of the child more adequately without sacrificing the very real benefits of our courts for children." Id. at
550.
6 It is not suggested that the juvenile court system is inherently unsuited for dispensing justice in a legal or constitutional manner. Rather, it is here recognized that to achieve its goals, a juvenile court must be capable of a flexibility which would be impossible if all of the rules which confine a legal proceeding to a specific form were imposed upon a juvenile court proceeding.
7 The rules governing a criminal proceeding are more restrictive upon the court than in other proceedings because of the desire to give the individual the greatest possible protection against the forces of the state brought to bear upon him. See Paulsen, supra note 5 at 561: "[the privilege against self-incrimination] is tied to the accusatorial scheme of the criminal law. It is an expression of the dignity of the accused although the collective power of the state is ranged against him."
Given the juvenile court's concern for the well-being of children, such rules, if applied with the same absoluteness as in a criminal case, could be detrimental to the operation of the juvenile court system. accused of criminal acts and the philosophy of the juvenile court system has centered about such issues as the right to trial by jury, 8 the assistance of counsel, 9 the privilege against self-incrimination,10 the right to bail n the protection against double jeopardy,u and the application of the strict rules of criminal evidence." In order to achieve its goals, the juvenile court required some means of overcoming these stringencies. Consequently all proceedings before the juvenile court were termed "civil," rather than "criminal."' 4 This made it possible for the juvenile court to go about its business with considerable freedom. Critics have asserted, however, that merely calling juvenile court proceedings "civil" does not make them so; that certain of the traditional procedural requirements are vitally necessary in juvenile court proceedings. 15 The basic issue is a test of "due process of law."' 464, 473 (1960) in regard to the exclusion of hearsay, the most controversial of the rules of criminal evidence in the juvenile court setting.
14 For an excellent discussion of the theory that juvenile court proceedings are not non-criminal in the delinquency area see Antieau, supra note 10 at 388-89.
15 Professor Paulsen, for example, points out that "We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by changing names from 'criminal prosecution' to 'delinquency proceedings.'" Paulsen, supra note 5 at 550. 16 Clearly a child "is entitled to due process of law whether the juvenile court administers civil or criminal justice." Ibi. See also Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 114 A.2d 896, 899 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954) where a motion to vacate a juvenile court commitment was denied on the ground that the movant was afforded due process of law. a juvenile court commitment upon a finding of delinquency. 17 The traditional method of collaterally questioning a loss of personal liberty is by a writ of habeas corpus. In federal jurisdictions a motion to vacate a sentence, under 28 U.S.C. §2255, is appropriate for that purpose.u s Generally, collateral attack of a court's decision via habeas corpus is not limited to criminal cases: such methods of collateral attack may serve in both civil and criminal cases 9 Consequently, the juvenile court is not saved from collateral review of its decisions by merely pointing out that civil and not criminal rules apply to proceedings before it. However, habeas corpus, or the alternative Section 2255 motion, enables one invoking it to obtain independent judicial inquiry into whether the juvenile court has failed to accord fundamental constitutional rights to a child. 2° Since what is questioned is restriction of individual liberty through incarceration, the inquiring court should not find much difficulty in throwing aside the label for the proceeding which led to the incarceration.n Collateral attack by habeas corpus may force a consideration of the claimed rights of a juvenile offender in a completely different context than 17 Since habeas corpus has long been accepted as a proper form for attacking custody determinations of a juvenile court, that question will not be considered in this paper. Early cases settled the availability of the Writ for that purpose. See, e.g., New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906) . Moreover the propriety of habeas corpus to determine custody has even been recognized by statute, see D.C. CODE, tit. 11, § 907 (1961 The guaranty of the privilege of habeas corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, in no way limits the Writ to detentions arising out of "criminal" proceedings. Even if different forms of the Writ exist to achieve purposes other than release from illegal detention, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 n. 5 (1963) , there is no authority for it being available only to inquire into "criminal" detentions. See O'Beirne v. Overholser, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 279, 287 F.2d 137 (1960) .
20 See notes 33-39 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the constitutional rights which have been held assertable via habeas corpus. 21 The prestige of the Writ lends credence to the disposition of a court to cut through labels for detention in inquiring into the legality thereof. that of the juvenile court setting, and in consequence it may yield a different result.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of collateral attack as a device to obtain review of juvenile court decisions and to determine what role, if any, such attack should play in the juvenile court system. Habeas corpus will be the collateral attack device examined because of its universal applicability and fairly uniform nature. The federal substitute for habeas corpus, a Section 2255 motion, will also be discussed because of the particular problems it presents in the District of Columbia.
HABEAS CORPUS AND SECTION 2255:
GENERAL LEGAL TmORy
Habeas corpus, the Great Writ, is one of the basic constitutional privileges accorded citizens of the United States. With roots reaching far into Anglo-American jurisprudence, the Great Writ carries extraordinary prestige. 22 Unlike the many privileges and freedoms later incorporated in the Bill of Rights, the privilege of habeas corpus was given explicit recognition in the original body of the Federal Constitution.4 Throughout the judicial history of this country, the highest courts have continually reiterated the duty of the judiciary to maintain the privilege unimpaired. One of the purposes of habeas corpus, and that for which it has most been used in the United States, is to inquire into illegal detention with a view to an order releasing the petitioner.
2 6 The United States Supreme Court has said of the Writ: Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled his immediate release.
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Although habeas corpus has been used to question detention in federal cases based upon judicial decisions alleged to be without jurisdiction, contrary to due process of law, or excessive of the committing court's authority or discretion, the scope of the Writ at the state level may be narrower.8 Whether the Supreme Court's holding that the scope of habeas corpus is not limited to questioning the committing court's jurisdiction 2 is applicable, or will be applied to the states as a constitutional mandate is not clear. 3° But even if an area of habeas corpus jurisdiction remains within the primary control of the states, it is apparent that the federal standards for applying federal habeas corpus relief may be invoked in a federal forum where state action impinges upon federally protected individual rights.
2 ' In other words, even though habeas corpus relief may only be available in a given state when the committing court acts without jurisdiction, a prisoner may ultimately test his detention in a federal court as to the broader areas of violation of due process or abuse of authority. Doubt does exist, however, as to whether the Writ may be used to raise procedural issues, evidentiary questions or other matters traditionally limited to assertion by direct appeal. 391, 404, 413-14 (1963) . 31 There is no indication that the states may not define their own habeas corpus remedy, and the scope of its availability, in any mannner they choose. The effect of Fay v. No*a, however, is to assure that federal constitutional safeguards may be protected by federal habeas corpus as an ultimate measure.
31 Pay v. Noia itself resulted from federal relief being sought after state remedies proved unsatisfactory.
22 Generally, errors committed during a trial may not be reviewed by collateral attack unless they involve the jurisdiction of the court or a deprivation of constitutional rights amounting to a denial of the essence of a fair trial. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) Before examining the availability of habeas corpus to attack a juvenile court decision, the federal substitute for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, will be discussed. Such discussion is undertaken because of the confusion engendered by this federal remedy even though the problem only arises in the federal court system, primarily in the District of Columbia. Although Section 2255, by its terms, thus does not apply to the courts of the District of Columbia, its remedy has been adopted by judicial decision in that jurisdiction, Burke v. United States, supra. However the question arises whether Section 2255 would come into play in the juvenile court setting in other federal courts. Since the Section clearly applies to federal courts in the territories, as well as in the several state districts, it is conceivable that a federally constituted juvenile court (similar to that of the District of Columbia) could exist in a territory. However, the territorial courts are generally established by the territory itself. For example, cases involving children in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (a territory of the United States) are adjudicated by courts of the Commonwealth in accordance with the domestic laws applicable thereto. LAWS OF PUERTO Rico ANN., tit. 34, ch. 147 (Supp. 1962) .
In the territories of the United States, it would be improbable for Section 2255 relief to be adopted by judicial decision as was done in the District of Columbia, although it is possible. Thus juvenile court decisions in a federal territory probably would not engender the same interplay between habeas corpus and Section 2255 as exists in the District of Columbia.
However, federal courts, including those of the territories of the United States, are governed by the federal laws relating to juvenile delinquency cases. 28 U.S.C.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to alleviate administrative problems created by habeas corpus in federal courts. Habeas corpus itself may be brought only in a court of the jurisdiction in which a prisoner is incarcerated. 4 ' Since a prisoner committed by a federal court may be sent to a prison located anywhere in the United States, the court which hears a habeas corpus petition in federal cases often is not the court which committed the petitioner. In such cases all the records of the case as well as the relevant witnesses and other persons may be located in another jurisdiction, often a great distance from the court hearing the habeas corpus petition. Consequently a federal habeas corpus proceeding may entail a great administrative burden in obtaining the records and persons necessary to complete a full evidentiary hearing. Section 2255 was enacted to ameliorate these burdens. It requires a prisoner to institute a motion to vacate sentence in the sentencing court.0 If the sentencing court is located in a jurisdiction other than that in which the prisoner is incarcerated, then the prisoner need only be transferred to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, if necessary, 4 for a hearing on his motion. § § 5031-37 (1958) . These statutory provisions are much more general in nature than most juvenile court acts and may only be used if the juvenile consents. 28 U.S.C. § 5032 (1958) . However, federal courts may, under this statutory scheme, act as a juvenile court. [It should be noted that the District Court for the District of Columbia has another source of power to act as a juvenile court. The Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia may waive jurisdiction over a child between the ages of 16 and 18, when that child is charged with an offense which if committed by a person 18 or over is a felony (or if a child of any age is charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed by a person 18 or over). In such a case the child is ordered held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of the offense if committed by a person 18 or over. Then, "the other court" has the alternative to "exercise the powers conferred upon the Juvenile Court" of the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE, tit. 11, § 1553 (Supp. IV. 1965 ).] Consequently, it is possible for Section 2255 to be utilized in juvenile cases in the federal court system in jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia.
Since the District of Columbia is the only federal jurisdiction wherein a traditional juvenile court system exists which would be most likely to call into play Section 2255, further discussion of the Section in federal juvenile court cases will be limited to those arising under the juvenile court legislation for the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) . 43 The Section provides that a motion thereunder may be entertained and determined "without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1958). However, the Supreme Court has indi-Section 2255 is, in terms, a substitute for habeas corpus." A federal prisoner may raise those issues which would be raised by a petition for habeas corpus only by a Section 2255 motion, unless relief under Section 2255 would be "inadequate or ineffective.
' 45 The only major restriction upon Section 2255 relief, other than the grounds for the motion (which are subject to the same restrictions as habeas corpus), is that the prisoner must at the time of the motion be incarcerated under the terms of the sentence which he is attacking.
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The major categories, or bases, for Section 2255 relief that have been reflected in the case law, are ineffective assistance of counsel, 47 mental incompetence at the time of trial," and the knowing use of perjured testimony at the trial. 205, 209-10 (1952) .
11 The basis of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hayman was recognized, by the Supreme Court, as being an unconstitutional "suspension" of habeas corpus. 342 U.S. at 209. Thus the Court's finding that Section 2255 has no "purpose to impinge upon prisoner's rights of collateral attack upon their convictions" and that the Section affords "the same rights [habeas corpus] in another and convenient forum," implicitly asserts the coextensiveness of Section 2255 relief with that of habeas corpus. Id. at 219. And such conclusion is supported by the language of the case notwithstanding the Court's assertion that "we do not reach constitutional questions." Id. at 223. ' 4 Ibid.
5-1373 U.S. 1 (1963).
56 Id. at 14. Legal Considerations A question which one first encounters in examining the propriety of the use of habeas corpus in regard to a juvenile court decision is whether there are legal obstacles in the very foundation of the system which preclude such collateral attack. Apart from considerations of policy which will be discussed later, the question is whether there are technical legal impediments to habeas corpus in attacking juvenile court judgments that do not exist with respect to other legal proceedings.
The novice to the juvenile court system is told that its proceedings are civil in nature, not criminal, even when a criminal act is that which has invoked the court's jurisdiction. 60 However, habeas corpus is not restricted to criminal cases plone." Any detention, even "executive detention,"12 is subject to inquiry by means of habeas corpus. Consequently, this distinction between juvenile court proceedings and those in other judicial forums should not preclude habeas corpus. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the type of detention that results from a juvenile court decision 415 (1953) . Even though such cases might be viewed as excluding Section 2255 relief in the juvenile court, upon the argument that no sentence is involved in a juvenile caseeven one involving delinquency determinations, the fact of commitment for an antisocial act refuses such a view. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
Is The issues raised by an attack of a juvenile court delinquency commitment will most likely be the same as those issues which would be raised by a habeas corpus attack of a criminal conviction and sentence, ie., deprivation of fundamental constitutional safeguards. Other questions must, of necessity, be raised by appeal or petition for rehearing.
9See text accompanying notes 44-45, supra. should determine whether habeas corpus would be proper to inquire into a child's detention. In White v. Reid," a juvenile committed by the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia sought release from the 'District of Columbia jail. In holding that habeas corpus should be available to obtain the child's release, the court stated that:
Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and physical wellbeing, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted to guidance, care, education and training rather than punishment, unless its supervision is that of a guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commitment to such institution is by reason of conviction of crime and cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards.4 The result in White is to assure a child committed for delinquency that his confinement will not put him in "communication with those convicted of crime.1 6 5 This result obviously comports with the philosophy of the juvenile court that those detained by the court are not to be punished but rather to be protected and guided.
The test enunciated in White would seemingly tolerate a "violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards" of a youth provided he is detailed in a suitable institution. It is the writer's opinion, however, that, if a juvenile court acts unconstitutionally, the court's action should not be insulated from assault merely because the juvenile is in a suitable, or even a happy, confinement. Neither the civil nature of the proceedings nor the characteristics of the institution should bar correction of the deprivation of constitutional rights by a juvenile court.
Generally juvenile courts are endowed with broad jurisdiction. 66 Consequently, lack of jurisdiction over a child charged with a criminal-type act would be less frequent in a juvenile court. Technical grounds for absence of jurisdiction might exist, however, as in other courts. Thus in On the other hand, it has been held that, where the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, habeas corpus will not lie. A decision to this effect is Lehman v. Montgomery, 70 in which the Indiana Supreme Court refused habeas corpus to a child's mother who sought her daughter's release from a girls' reform school claiming, inter alia, that the child did not have assistance of counsel in the proceeding resulting in detention. The Indiana court stated that a writ of habeas corpus raises only the question of jurisdiction of the court over the person and subject matter and that, since the allegations by the applicant did not demonstrate such lack of jurisdiction, habeas corpus could not lie.
7 '
Other state courts, in addition to Indiana's, have defined the scope of habeas corpus in narrow terms.1 2 However, it is now clear that federal habeas corpus, which is ultimately available to protect against violation of federal constitutional safeguards, permits broad inquiryY 3 Therefore, the mere fact that a juvenile court has exercised proper - ' 162 Mich. 1, 126 N.W. 1049 (1910 ). 68 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W. 771 (1918 . 69 For an excellent discussion of the jurisdictional defect requirement of habeas corpus in juvenile cases see Hickey, Habeas Corpus and Juvenile Courts, 15 Juv.
CT. JUDGEs JouR., Summer 1964 ,p. 7, 8-10. 70 233 Ind. 391, 120 N.E.2d 172 (1954 . 11 In Lehman, it should be noted, remedies other than habeas corpus were available, i.e., the petitioner could have raised the issues alleged on appeal, but sought habeas corpus instead. However, the emphasis of the opinion is the failure to assert jurisdictional defects, not failure to appeal. jurisdiction in a particular case should be no legal obstacle to inquiry into the propriety of its action by means of habeas corpus. The jurisdiction of a juvenile court may not only be broad; it may even be "exclusive and original." 7 4 Taken literally such jurisdiction would preclude other courts from inquiring into the propriety of a juvenile court decision. However, the juvenile court statute itself may exempt habeas corpus proceedings from such exclusiveness (although the exemption may be limited to custody determinations), 7 and, even if habeas corpus were not by the terms of the statute permitted, habeas corpus must necessarily be read into the system to prevent the institution of the juvenile court from being found unconstitutional in that regard. 76 The constitutional guarantee of the privilege of habeas corpus would preclude its "suspension," even though the propriety of an othenvise "exclusive" juvenile court decision would thereby be brought into question.
Generally the statute governing the juvenile court system in a given jurisdiction will provide that any order or decision of the juvenile court may be appealed to the appropriate appellate court for review by a party aggrievedY. The existence of such right of appeal would apparently restrict the use of habeas corpus stringently since habeas corpus is not proper unless other available remedies are exhausted. illustrates this point well. In Areson habeas corpus was sought for the release of a child adjudged a delinquent and committed to a State Industrial School by the New York Children's Court. The New York court denied the petition, which alleged a noncompliance with a statutory requirement of probation investigation and report, on the ground that the irregularity could be corrected on appeal. The court noted that the error did not create a jurisdictional defect, but based its decision primarily upon the existence of the appeal remedy and the concomitant discretion of the reviewing court in the exercise of its general equity jurisdiction which would be the only other basis for its intervention into the case. [Vol. 57
JUVENILE COURT D4CISIONS
Areson and other cases like it do no more than point out that habeas corpus is not a proper substitute for other adequate remedies. If permitted in such cases, habeas corpus would become a device whereby one court could "second-guess" another court in the same case without a showing of a particularized need. s K However, this limitation on habeas corpus is not the same as an absolute bar to the use of the Writ against other legal proceedings, including those of the juvenile court. This requirement of exhaustion of other remedies is merely an inherent limitation upon the use of the Writ; in other words, habeas corpus may only be used when other remedies are exhausted.
A corollary of the broad right of appeal in juvenile cases is the power of a juvenile court to rehear and modify a decree at any time.
s This power offers a person who is discontented with a juvenile court decision another remedy which usually does not exist in other fields of law. This power serves to extend the limitation upon the use of habeas corpus in regard to a juvenile court decision, since it extends the time of the continuing jurisdiction of the court. As noted in the Areson case, the continuing jurisdiction of the court of the first instance, through the availability of appeal, is the factor which precludes another court from interferingPn Continuing jurisdiction, therefore, prevents collateral attack because the opportunity exists for correction of the alleged error by the court allegedly committing the error.
Despite the foregoing considerations, the question arises whether one is precluded from seeking habeas corpus relief from a juvenile court detention at any time on the chance that successive applications for rehearing will result in the relief sought. Even if one is required to seek rehearing before invoking habeas to inquire into a juvenile court-ordered detention, it would be unreasonable to bar forever habeas corpus inquiry on the ground that the juvenile court might sometime alter its decision. Certainly "grave constitutional doubts" might be engendered by such interference with habeas corpus.P s1 Hickey, supra note 69 at 9-10, suggests that the only justifiable basis for permitting habeas corpus to be utilized to attack a juvenile court decision is lack of jurisdiction, unless a particularized need is shown, because otherwise there would be judicial second-guessing as between different courts. Of the possible legal obstacles which have been discussed, the most difficult to overcome are the broad right of appeal and the continuing power of the juvenile court to rehear and modify its deci, sions. However, even these are not complete roadblocks; rather, they are high hurdles in the path. The existence of other remedies, as previously noted, often necessitates the avoidance of habeas corpus. But, if the goal of habeas corpus is to insure fair judicial treatment, one should not be too upset if he can obtain review to that end without resorting to habeas corpus. For, if the other remedies do not satisfy, the Great Writ will still be available to achieve the desired inquiry when properly invoked.
Policy Considerations
The avowed goal of the juvenile court system is to insure that "each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance, and control that will ,conduce to his welfare and the best interests of the state, and that when he is removed from the control of his parents the courts shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which they should have given him". 5 It will be noted that this policy statement gives the welfare of the child priority, at least in written sequence, over the "best interests of the state." This factor, more than any other, argues for an isolationist treatment of the juvenile court system by other judicial courts and other authoritative bodies.
-The ultimate aim of juvenile courts should be to cope with the complex problems of juveniles with a minimum of difficulty, drawing upon the social sciences when necessary to effect a solution. Such a court would be more than a court, certainly different from the traditional judicial court, and would require a degree of independence unparalleled in Anglo-American jurisprudence. For such a system to function as planned, a fundamental imperative is the acceptance of the ability of the institution of the juvenile court to achieve its goals in guarding the welfare of the child.
Weighing against the acceptance of the ability of the juvenile court to act in the best interest of a child is the other goal of the juvenile court, namely the protection of the interests of the state. When this factor is added, the juvenile court as an institution must function as would a criminal court when dealing with a child accused of criminal 85 Standard Juvenile Court Act, supra note 68 § 1.
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